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Against Abortion: A Protestant Proposal 
Gilbert Meilaender 
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religious studies at the University of Virginia. 
For anyone troubled by the prevalence of abortion in our society, 
Roman Catholic moral theology is likely to appear inviting. And, 
indeed, it would be hard to deny that, from the normative perspective 
of one who is deeply disturbed by an easy acceptance of abortion, 
Catholic moral theology has prove9 far more satisfactory than most 
Protestant ethical reflection . 1 In limiting permissible abortions to 
cases where life conflicts with equal life, Catholic thought, though 
unacceptable to many in our society, will be congenial to the Protes-
tant who also believes that fetal life is human life and that all human 
lives are entitled to equal respect. Yet, the Catholic position on abor-
tion, relying as it does on the difficult concept of indirect killing and 
the related double-effect category, presents the Protestant (not to 
mention others) with certain problems. Furthermore, in suggesting 
that even in certain conflict cases we must simply stand aside and 
permit nature to take its course, Catholic moral reflection runs con-
trary to some of our most fundamental intuitions and seems to con-
sider insufficiently the fact that the "nature" we know is disordered 
and cannot simply be equated with "creation" as it comes from the 
hand of the Creator. 
On the other hand, the great advantage of Catholic teaching con-
cerning abortion is that those interventions which it does countenance 
are strictly limited to a carefully circumscribed set of cases - thereby 
avoiding the danger of justifying far more than we originally intended. 
The Protestant, if he foregoes concepts such as indirect killing and 
double effect, is in danger of finding no way to limit the death-dealing 
blow to a circumscribed set of cases where life conflicts with equal 
life . It is not surprising therefore to see that Paul Ramsey, the Protes-
tant ethicist who has written most effectively against abortion, 
should have adopted double-effect as a way of articulating what (he 
thinks) Christian love requires .2 Nevertheless, it is worth asking whether 
a Protestant position can be developed which will both dispense with 
double-effect categories and at the same time provide some of the 
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limitations on abortion which Catholic moral theology has offered. In 
this paper I will suggest the outlines of such a Protestant position.3 
Though the Catholic position, having developed over centuries, is in 
some ways enormously complex, I will concern myself only with what 
seem to be the essential elements. At its core, it seems to me, the 
Catholic position achieves two things: 1) it affirms the equal value of 
every individual human being and, therefore, the right of every human 
life to protection; 2) it finds a way (by means of the concept of 
indirect killing) to permit intervention in some but not all cases of 
parity conflicts of life with life. What is important - and deserving of 
great respect - is the way in which 1) and 2) are held together in a 
coherent position. Those interventions which are permitted are under-
stood in such a way that they do not call into question the funda-
mental premise (equal respect for human lives) on which the position 
is based. I am suggesting that an appropriate Protestant position would 
be one which accepted 1) but found a substitute for 2) - a substitute 
which would permit us to intervene in all (not just some) conflict 
cases but which would, like the Catholic position, countenance no 
intervention except in parity conflict cases. 
I 
The first element in the Catholic position really grows out of several 
beliefs which are, or ought to be, common Christian affirmations. All 
human life comes from God, is endowed by Him with worth and 
dignity, and ought therefore to be respected and protected. 
The affirmation that all human life comes from God is connected to 
the imperative enjoining equal protection of all human lives by the 
rule which St. Thomas describes as the fundamental natural law: do 
good and avoid evil. This imperative, combined with a belief that life is 
God's gift, requires that we both seek to preserve life and refrain from 
direct killing of innocent life . Nevertheless, this fundamental natural 
law actually involves two precepts : "do good" and "avoid evil." And 
there is a sense in which the second of these has priority over the first. 4 
We are to do all the good we can, but that means all the good we 
morally can. It is conceivable, in other words, that certain acts which 
are intrinsically evil (and which therefore violate the precept " avoid 
evil") might, at the same time, benefit our fellows (and therefore 
fulfill the precept "do good"). Should any such case arise, Catholic 
moral theology has traditionally maintained that the negative precept 
takes precedence over the positive. We cannot do evil that good may 
come of it. We are to do all the good we morally can, not simply all 
the good we can. 
A similar point has sometimes been made in terms of the distinction 
between duties of perfect and imperfect obligation. Duties of perfect 
obligation (like the negative precept) always bind. Duties of imperfect 
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obligation (like the positive precept) enjoin us to act in certain ways 
but do not specify the precise circumstances under which we are to do 
so. Hence, my duty to be beneficent to my fellows is a duty of 
imperfect obligation. It enjoins certain action but permits me to 
decide the times and places in which I will carry out my beneficence. 
On the other hand, a duty of perfect obligation always binds in all 
circumstances - e.g., the duty to refrain from inflicting needless suf-
fering. 
Suggestion on Doing Good 
The suggestion that we are to do all the good we morally can is 
sometimes made not by stressing that negative precepts take priority 
over positive or by explicating the distinction between duties of per-
fect and imperfect obligation, but by distinguishing between moral 
and physical evil. To say that we cannot do evil that good may come 
of it is not to say that we could never cause certain physical evils in 
order to achieve some good effects. It is moral evil which cannot be 
done even for the sake of achieving certain good effects. The difficulty 
the Protestant almost instinctively feels with this distinction is that it 
inevitably strikes him as an attempt to "keep our hands clean" and 
refrain from sin even if the price is also refraining from service to the 
neighbor. I want to suggest, however, that something like this distinc-
tion ought to be part of any serious Protestant ethic and that it can be 
correctly understood. To say that (moral) evil cannot be done even in 
order to achieve (physical) good simply means in this context that the 
precept "avoid evil" retains its priority. The Protestant may still feel 
that formulating the distinction in terms of moral and physical evil is 
unnecessarily (and unbiblically) dualistic and that it ignores the con-
nection of a physically disordered creation with human sin. Neverthe-
less, I think we may put the distinction in quite acceptable ways. 
In order to do this I will begin by drawing on several examples 
taken from the British moral philosopher, Philippa Foot.5 She sug-
gests that we consider the following two cases and ponder our reac-
tions to them: 
1) You are the driver of a runaway railroad engine. You can steer 
only from one narrow track onto another, no other options being 
open to you. On one of these tracks five men are working, and on the 
other one man is working. What should you do? 
2) You are a judge faced with rioters demanding that a culprit be 
found for a cerlain crime. The rioters have taken five hostages whom 
they threaten to put to death unless the culprit is punished. Since the 
real culprit is unknown, it is suggested that you frame one innocent 
person, thereby saving the five hostages and having to execute only 
the one innocent man. What should you do? 
Intuitively we are likely to think that in case (1) we ought to steer 
toward the track where only one man is working but that in case 
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(2) we ought not frame one innocent man in order to save the five. 
Yet, in both cases we might say that the consequences are the same 
- the numbers certainly are . Why think that five ought to be saved in 
case (1) and not also in case (2)? 
Foot suggests that we distinguish between positive and negative 
duties (which is nothing more, really, than her way of distinguishing 
the two halves of the injunction to "do good and avoid evil"). Neg-
ative duties enjoin us to refrain from injuring other persons in a 
variety of ways. Positive duties enjoin us to bring aid, also in a variety 
of ways. Foot's crucial assertion, which is in agreement with the 
description of Catholic moral theology given above, is that if a neg-
ative and a positive duty conflict, the negative duty has the stronger 
claim upon us. 
This distinction helps to show what is at stake in our differing 
intuitions with respect to Foot's two examples. In case (1) we have a 
conflict between negative duties - harming either one or five men. In 
such a circumstance, Foot thinks we can do little more than save the 
larger number of men. But in case (2) we have a conflict of a negative 
with a positive duty - the duty to refrain from injuring the innocent 
man and the duty to bring aid, if we can, to the five hostages. In such 
a case the negative duty has, according to Foot, the stronger claim 
upon us. We ought always, of course, try to bring aid if we can. But, as 
we have seen, that means "if we morally can," and the violation of a 
negative duty is not an acceptable means to choose for fulfilling a 
positive duty. This may help us to see that it is not simply a question 
of permitting physical evil in order to avoid moral evil - a formulation 
which seems semantically to smack of protecting our moral purity and 
keeping our hands clean, or which suggests that physical evil is totally 
unrelated to our moral failure. Instead, we can see that we are simply 
trying to understand the relation between several kinds of moral obliga-
tions. The agent is not simply attempting to retain his moral upright-
ness. Rather, he is asking what fidelity to our various neighbors and 
their claims upon us would require. 
We can apply the distinction to the matter of abortion and then 
consider what theological backing we might offer in support of Foot's 
philosophy and our intuitions. By distinguishing negative from pos-
itive duties and giving greater moral weight to the former we can, it 
seems, limit permissible abortions to eases of conflict of life with 
equal life. We will have to refrain from injuring the fetus in order to 
assist family planning projects (even those of relatively impoverished 
families, who certainly ought to be aided in other ways which do not 
violate negative duties); we will have to refrain from injuring the fetus 
in order to satisfy a whim of the mother, even one grounded in an 
alleged right to privacy; and so forth. In all such cases the duty not to 
harm the fetus will take precedence over our other obligations to bring 
both serious and trivial aid to others involved. 
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Furthermore, it is possible to provide some theological warrant for 
this sort of distinction. Why is it that negative duties should carry 
greater moral weight than positive duties? It is, I suggest, because from 
the perspective of Christian theology moral agents must always be 
viewed as creatures. The creature is one who understands his life and 
action in terms of a story God is telling, a story which begins in the 
primeval creative utterance and which will one day, having reached its 
appointed conclusion, end. Only the Author of the drama is in a 
position to specify clearly the ultimate significance of the roles which 
particular creatures are called upon to play.6 Only He may fully see 
how the various roles make up a coherent whole. The creature who 
plays his role may be very uncertain of its final significance or impor-
tance; he may even be uncertain whether the story is now in its final 
chapters or whether the plot is really just beginning to get off the 
ground. In short, the creature is not responsible for the whole of the 
story or for all the consequences of his action. Rather, he is respon-
sible for playing well the role allotted him. C. S. Lewis has put the 
point well, by appealing to another story. 
In King Lear (III:vii) there ia a man who is such a minor character that 
Shakespeare has not given him even a name: he is merely 'First Servant.' All 
the characters around him - Regan, Cornwall, and Edmupd - have fine 
long-term plans. They think they know how the story is going to end, and 
they are quite wrong. The servant has no such delusions. He has no notion 
how the play is going to go. But he understands the present scene. He sees 
an abomination (the blinding of old Gloucester) taking place. He will not 
stand it. His sword is out and pointed at his master's breast in a moment: 
then Regan stabs him dead from behind. This is his whole part: eight lines 
all told. But if it were real life and not a play, that is the part it would be 
best to have acted. 7 
Distinction Anti-Consequentialistic 
Foot's distinction, like the traditional Catholic view, is an anti-con-
sequentialist position, and I am suggesting that understanding what it 
means to be a creature provides some warrant for this. Our duty as 
creatures is not necessarily to achieve the best consequences in gen-
eral, but to act out with fidelity the responsibilities given us. To say 
that certain things ought not be done even in order to achieve what 
seem to be good consequences is to say that the creature is responsible 
for doing all the good he morally can, not all that he can. To under-
stand ourselves as creatures is to believe that we ought not step out of 
the story and think of ourselves as author rather than character. We 
are not to orchestrate the final denouement; we are simply to be 
responsible. 
It is a measure of how much this Christian story has lost its hold on 
our consciousness that many today might be horror-stricken by any 
counsel which suggests that we think of our responsibility in terms 
which limit it. But, of course, (as anyone who knows the Christian 
May, 1978 169 
story can attest), this is not an attempt to evade guilt; rather, it is an 
attempt to understand ourselves as what we are : creatures, not the 
creator; characters, not the author. It may be that we cannot under-
stand ourselves in such a way (and limit our action accordingly) apart 
from faith that the Author of the story knows what He is doing and 
can bring it to a successful completion. Within the terms of the story, 
a situation which seems to invite us to give greater weight to a positive 
than a negative duty is to be viewed as a temptation - an inducement 
once again to view ourselves as gods and to try to take into our own 
hands the course of the story and unlimited responsibility for the 
consequences of our action. 
That kind of unlimited responsibility ought be accepted by no one 
except God. Perhaps, of course, the story will turn out all wrong and 
the consequences will be deplorable. That is the risk we take as we live 
in hope. Within the confines of the story, however, that possibility 
must be understood, not as a call to moral agents to take over the 
Creator's responsibility, but as a temptation to believe that God either 
cannot bring off what He has said He can or does not want to. It 
raises, in short, either the old problem of evil or a straightforward 
temptation for faith. But in either case, our first recourse ought not be 
to revise our judgment about what moral agents, understood as crea-
tures, can rightfully do. There is good theological reason to support 
Foot's distinction between negative and positive duties as well as her 
belief that, in a conflict between the two, negative duties take prior-
ity. This should, indeed, be part of what it means to call ourselves 
creatures. 
II 
Thus far I have simply tried to make clear why we ought to affirm 
that human lives not in conflict be protected from direct attack, even 
if the cost of doing so is the sacrifice of other goods. But what of cases 
where life conflicts with equal life? This brings us to the second ele-
ment in the traditional Catholic position, to the related concepts of 
indirect killing and double effect. It is not, after all, clear how, grant-
ing what has been said in the previous section, intervention would be 
justified even in such conflict cases. When one life conflicts with 
another, both are still human lives. Each is still our "neighbor" - one 
whose very presence among us calls out for respect and protection. 
And it seems quite patently true in such cases that in order to serve 
one neighbor we must turn against the well-being of the other. This 
seems to be the structure of a genuine conflict situation: We must 
either (a) serve neither neighbor; or (b) turn against the well-being of 
one of the conflicting lives. It is, in other words, a situation in which 
doing good seems to entail doing evil, thus creating an incoherence in 
the fundamental moral law. 
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Foot's example which I used above, tends to overlook this fact for a 
very simple reason. The case of the runaway railroad engine (Le., an 
analogue to a permitted killing case) is one in which the agent is 
already in action and can do nothing to avoid killing either one or five 
persons. He cannot stop. Non-intervention is not a possibility for him. 
But it is always a possibility in cases where the lives of mother and 
fetus come into conflict. It is always possible to "do nothing" and 
permit nature to take its course. Paul Ramsey has suggested that we 
are faced with three alternatives in such cases of conflict: 1) we can 
remain equalitarian (i.e., valuing both lives in conflict equally) and 
stand aside; 2) we can abandon equal regard and intervene in order to 
preserve the life we consider of greater worth; 3) we can remain equal-
itarian but nevertheless intervene by reasoning in double effect 
categories. 8 
Any Protestant - indeed, any Christian - who affirms the "alien 
dignity" of every human being is not likely to be attracted by the 
second of these options. We appear, then, to be left with the options 
of non-intervention or double effect. I will suggest later that Ramsey 
has not exhausted the possibilities, but for now let us consider the 
traditional Catholic response, a response which Ramsey wishes largely 
to uphold. 
In such conflict cases, Catholic thought has tried to find a way to 
do good (intervene) while at the same time avoiding evil (refraining 
from directly attacking innocent life). Obviously, this is not going to 
be easy. If we truly value these two lives in conflict equality, it is 
difficult to see how we could intervene to protect one against the 
other. The solution offered has been that of "indirect killing." A 
well-known example of a case in which intervention has been per-
mitted is that of a pregnant woman whose uterus is cancerous. In such 
a situation, it is claimed, the intervention is targeted upon the cancer-
ous uterus. Removal of it is the direct intention of the act. The death 
of the fetus, though foreseen and permitted, is nevertheless not 
approved and not intended. In other words, in such an intervention, 
one act is carried out, but it is an act with a double effect (removing 
the cancerous uterus; killing the fetus). The evil effect is not embraced 
as part of the agent's plan. It is possible to describe the intervention in 
such a way that the agent's plan of action (his aim) can be seen to be 
saving the life of the mother by a means which, as it happens, also 
involves indirectly killing the life of the fetus . 
At the same time, we can consider another case in which intervention 
could not, it would seem, be justified on these traditional grounds. 
Consider the case, alluded to by Paul Ramsey, of an induced abortion 
necessary as a first step toward dealing with a case of misplaced, acute 
appendicitis (in which the pregnant woman's appendix will rupture if 
the fetus is not aborted so that the physician can get to the appendix). 
Such an intervention would not fit the paradigm of indirect killing. 9 
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For here we have really two distinct acts, the first of which kills the 
fetus and is a means toward the second, which deals with the threat to 
the mother's life. In such a case it is difficult to claim that we have not 
embraced the death of the fetus within our aim. To permit such an 
intervention, then, would seem to involve doing evil that good may 
come of it or, in Foot's terminology, violating a negative duty for the 
sake of a positive duty. 
Distinctions Between Interventions 
Thus, intervention would be permitted in the case of the cancerous 
uterus but not in the case of the misplaced, acute appendicitis. Never-
theless, it is difficult not to agree with Ramsey when he writes that a 
distinction between these cases "would not be confirmed by common 
sense or intuitive moral judgment." 10 Unfortunately, though, the 
same might be said of Ramsey's attempt to save double effect cate-
gories by suggesting that in the second case we permit the intervention 
by understanding the intention of the doctor's action to be not killing 
the fetus but, rather, incapacitating it from doing what it is doing to 
the life of the mother.ll That comes dangerously close to making the 
concept of intention a "waxen nose" which we may twist and tum as 
we feel necessary. While approving Ramsey's intuitions we may well 
wonder whether we can deny that intervention in such a case would 
necessarily imply that the death of the fetus had been incorporated 
into our plan of action. Elizabeth Anscombe suggested that it was 
"nonsense to pretend that you do not intend to do what is the means 
you take to your chosen end."12 That is, for me at least, too strong. 
It is not nonsense, as Ramsey's careful discussion demonstrates,_ but 
still, it is far from being a persuasive re-description for the simple 
reason that it seems too obvious an attempt to save a theory which is 
in deep trouble. The human act of doing is here understood too 
exclusively in terms of intention divorced from the physical structure 
of the act. 
The comparison of these cases points to the two major problems 
which the Protestant (as well as many others) is likely to feel with the 
concepts of indirect killing and double effect . If we try to permit 
intervention in all such conflict cases, we will stretch the notion of 
indirect killing beyond recognition and enmesh ourselves in a veritable 
semantic bog through which the Protestant urge toward simplicity 
seeks to cut. If, on the other hand, we adhere to a straightforward 
notion of what double effect permits, we will simply have to recognize 
that in some conflict cases, it will be evident that we have really left 
ourselves with non-intervention as the only remaining alternative. 
What we need is a perspective which will permit us to intervene in all 
(not just some) parity conflict cases but which will not countenance 
intervention except in conflict cases. 
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III 
I suggest that a justification for intervention in conflict cases, which 
is different from any of the three alternatives Ramsey describes, is 
possible. Helmut Thielicke has suggested that in such conflict cases we 
come face to face with the disorder sin brings to nature, not with an 
unblemished creation reflecting perfectly the will of its Creator. And 
he further maintains that in such cases "we grant to medical assistance 
the mission to set forth in a signlike (though admittedly imperfect) 
way God's real will for the world and allow it to be a reminder of the 
original perfect creation and a promise of the world to come." 13 That 
is, we are to give expression to our belief (and our hope) that the 
heavenly Father is a loving, not an indifferent, Father - one who does 
not hesitate to involve Himself in our radically disordered world. 
Thielicke's point might be put in this way: in a conflict case we 
must either serve neither neighbor or tum directly against the well-
being of our neighbor. But to serve neither neighbor is inhuman in a 
specifiable sense. It is at least a necessary condition of a genuinely 
human relationship that it be characterized by giving and receiving. It 
is our task to shape "natural" events in such a way that they are 
humanized - are, that is, characterized by at least some giving and 
receIvmg. To require non-intervention makes it impossible so to 
humanize a case where life conflicts with equal life. (Obviously , it 
would be very different should the mother freely offer herself on 
behalf of the child. In that instance the relationship would be clearly 
and dramatically characterized by such giving and receiving.) The 
requirement of non-intervention in parity conflict cases involves, 
therefore, an indifference to our human condition, a willingness to 
accept a relationship which has not yet risen to the personal, human 
level. If we understand this, we can also see why abortion ought to be 
permitted in cases of rape, even though these are not conflict cases in 
any normal sense. For they are (almost paradigmatically) cases which 
exemplify what is inhuman - a relationship totally devoid of any gen-
uine giving and receiving. Here again, the woman whose personhood 
has been violated might nevertheless choose to wrest some human 
significance from her tragedy by carrying the child to term and offer-
ing to bear the burden which this involves. But to require her to do so 
would once again make it impossible for giving and receiving actually 
to transform the situation. 
What we have then is a justification of intervention in conflict cases 
which proceeds not by assuming it is permissible (as Foot does), not 
by moving to categories of double effect and indirect killing, and 
(contra Ramsey's suggestion as to the possible alternatives) not by 
ceasing to affirm the equal worth of fetus and mother. It is only after 
he has justified intervention - as a means of witnessing in a signlike 
way to the real will of God, or, we might say, a means of humanizing a 
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natural event - that Thielicke goes on to discuss the possibly penn is-
sible balancing of the fetus' life against that of the mother. That 
balancing, however, is not involved in the justification of intervention 
per se. It occurs only in the course of deciding whom intervention 
should save, having detennined on other grounds that such interven-
tion is morally pennissible. Conceptually, the two decisions are kept 
separate. 
We now have the outlines of an acceptable Protestant position. It 
would, like Catholic moral theology, limit intervention to cases where 
life conflicts with equal life. This would be done by means of the 
distinction between positive and negative duties, grounded in a recog-
nition of our creaturely condition, and done in a way which would 
make it clear semantically that we are not engaged in any attempt to 
preserve our moral uprightness. It would, unlike Catholic moral 
theology, permit intervention in ' all parity conflict cases, recognizing 
the need to inject at least some element of giving and receiving into 
these tragic cases in order to bear witness to God's own love. It would 
also permit intervention in cases of pregnancy resulting from forcible 
intercourse, on the grounds that the continued presence of the fetus 
incarnates the inhuman violation, not just of the woman's body, but 
of her person; and that, as in the traditional conflict case, we cannot 
rest content in acknowledging a situation entirely devoid of human 
acts of giving and receiving. The justification of pennitted interven-
tions would proceed free of the semantic difficulties which beset the 
concept of indirect killing and free of the prevailing tendency to 
engage in estimates of comparative worth of human lives. This posi-
tion seems in many ways a desirable alternative. 
IV 
One problem remains. Earlier we characterized the core of the Cath-
olic position as involving two essential elements: 1) an affirmation of 
the equal right of every human life to protection; and 2) justification 
of indirect killing in some (but not all) cases where life conflicts with 
equal life. Much of the strength of this traditional position lies in its 
coherence. The interventions permitted in (2) are pennitted in a way 
which does not call into question premise (1) on which the position 
was founded. Direct killing is always proscribed, in accord with the 
first element of the position. The killings pennitted under the second 
aspect of the position are only those which can be understood to be 
indirect. Coherence is maintained though, as we have seen, at the 
possible cost of either losing our way in a semantic bog or acquiescing 
in non-intervention in certain cases (and thereby refusing to transfonn 
a disordered creation by infusing some element of giving and receiving 
into natural events). But there is at least coherence, no small virtue. 
Can the same be said of the alternative I have proposed? If interven-
tion is permitted in order to bear witness in a disordered world to the 
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Creator's real will for His creation, what is there to prohibit us - on 
occasions other than actual cases of parity conflict between lives -
from violating negative duties in order "to set forth in a signlike 
(though admittedly imperfect) way God's real will for the world"? 
Have we, in other words, justified intervention in terms which might 
permit it also in other cases which, though they manifest the disorder 
of a sinful world, are not themselves instances where life conflicts with 
equal life or situations in which there remains no other way to be 
humanly present in acts of giving and receiving? There may, after all, 
be many circumstances in life which, though they do not so dramat-
ically manifest the disorder of a sinful world and are not totally 
devoid of possibilities for giving and receiving, are nevertheless far 
from exemplifying God's real will for the world. Would it be permis-
sible to violate negative duties in order to improve such situations? If 
it were permissible, the two halves of my suggested position -limiting 
intervention to conflict cases only; justifying it in all such cases-
would prove incoherent. We would be forced back to a choice be-
tween (a) non-intervention; and (b) simply weighing magnitudes of 
evil (i.e., calculating consequences). 
It may help us to appreciate what is at stake theologically if we 
back off for a moment from the problem of abortion and consider a 
different problem in medical ethics. In his seminal work, The Patient 
as Person, 14 Paul Ramsey has a chapter in which he discusses ethical 
considerations involved in the self-giving of vital organs. The bulk of 
the chapter, which cannot be adequately summarized here, consists of 
an examination of Catholic and Protestant justifications for such self-
giving. Catholic justifications, all versions of a principle of totality, 
rely on some benefit believed to accrue to the donor. Any such justifi-
cation of organ donation will, of course, have to be a principle of 
totality which takes into account the spiritual and moral well-being of 
the donor. The donor is permitted to sacrifice an organ and injure his 
physical well-being for the sake of his total personal welfare - the 
fulfillment which this act of giving will bring him. 
On the other hand, "a possible justification of organ transplantation 
from living donors that might be developed within the ambit of 
Protestant ethics would rest the matter upon charitable consent alone; 
the benefit aimed at would be the benefit to the recipient, not the 
donor's own higher wholeness." 15 Thus, Ramsey seeks to justify 
organ donation by appeal to the self-giving spirit of Christian love 
(agape). Having done this, however, he immediately confronts a prob-
lem. To stress agape alone lends tremendous pressure to appeals for 
medical intervention to help someone in need. Such a justification of 
self-giving may, Ramsey writes, "precisely because of its freedom from 
the moorings of self-concern, be likely to fly too high above concern 
for the bodily integrity of the donor." 16 At this point, he suggests, 
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physicians will have to "save us from the moralists" and remain the 
" only Hebrews." This is Ramsey's somewhat poetic way of saying that 
it will never be sufficient to speak of agape alone. Such talk, in isola-
tion, will be unable to limit pressures for intervention (pressures to 
"do good"); indeed, it will intensify such pressures . Rather, we must 
make clear that ours is always to be a creaturely love. There is a very 
fine line - but a crucial one - which separates genuine creaturely love 
from a love which soars too high and forgets its created dependence. 
And an agape which does soar too high, in thus forgetting its creature-
ly moorings has, in fact, become sin. Indeed, it has been subtly trans-
muted into that primal sin: pride. So fine is the line which divides 
creaturely love from a renewed attempt to be like God. 
What I have been suggesting in this paper is that something similar 
happens when we attempt to construct a Protestant position concerning 
abortion. We find ourselves pulled in two different directions. On the 
one hand, when we consider the limits which our creaturely condition 
places upon us, we seem driven to prohibit intervention. For we, after 
all, are only creatures. The good we are to do is only the good which 
can morally be done. We do not author the whole story. When, on the 
other hand, we take seriously the call to let our life be shaped by the 
self-giving love of Christ, the pressures to intervene - to testify to God 
as One Who is loving, not indifferent - become intense. An incoher-
ence seems driven into the very heart of our position. 
To put it this way helps us to see what is at stake theologically and 
why it is that incoherence must be risked and both halves of the 
position maintained. We would be mistaken - theologically mis-
taken - to choose either (a) non-intervention; or (b) simply weighing 
magnitudes of evil. Neither would do justice to the full character of 
human relationships. The former would divest such relationships of 
the giving and receiving necessary to raise them to the human level. 
The latter would ignore the limits of our creaturely responsibility. We 
need to do justice to creation and redemption; both parts of the 
story God is telling must shape our action. If we cannot bring about a 
perfectly coherent fit between the two, that is perhaps not surprising. 
It is, rather, almost what we should expect of people whose status is 
that of pilgrims - people who find themselves in the midst of the 
story, often unable to discern its direction of movement, its total 
significance, or how the Author will manage to weave the many 
threads of the plot together in such a way as to resolve seeming 
incoherence. 
We therefore have a theological reason not to permit ourselves to be 
overtaken by "foolish consistency." We need to justify intervention in 
parity conflict cases lest our witness seem to be to an indifferent 
rather than a loving Father. For in these cases there is no other way to 
bear witness to God's real will for His creation, no other way to infuse 
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some element of giving and receiving into the natural event. At the 
same time there are good reasons for limiting intervention to just such 
cases. As sinful creatures we are always tempted to soar too high, to 
try to be as gods, and to take final responsibility for the whole of the 
story. It is important that we limit our interventions in such a way 
that we remain human and creaturely.17 
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